Given that the phenomenon of capture of public programs by sections the population is rampant in developing countries, households can indulge in a strategy to improve their participating in public programs by bribing the suppliers of such programs. This is an important issue affecting both the supply of local public goods and the incidence of corruption. To the best of our knowledge there is no analysis of the impact of bribery on participating in a local public goods program, anywhere. Using a unique data set for rural India this paper addresses the question of whether households bribe elected officials responsible for assuring such supply to improve their access to local public goods. We find considerable evidence of such bribing. We also model the welfare effects of such bribing on groups of households as well as the impact of bribery on aggregate welfare. Several policy conclusions are advanced. JEL Classification Codes: D31, D63, D73, O12
Introduction
It is well known that Indian villages are very deficient in the supply of local public goods, although some improvements have been made over time. Using Census data for 1991 and
2001 Table A1 shows large deficiencies in villages in respect of several key public goods, e.g., in 2001 only 41 per cent of villages had access to tap water. Although other sources of water were available there may be several instances of overlap, e.g., villages with access to water from a river may also have tap water. Further, the incidence of such deprivation may fall very unevenly within households. Thus, Desai et. al. (2011) show that, on average, rural women spend 66 minutes day fetching water, whereas men spend 29 minutes.
It is against this background that the Panchayati Raj Amendment to the Indian Constitution sought to delegate more administrative and financial powers to village panchayats (councils).
A long and distinguished tradition in public economics (for a review in the context of developing countries see Banerjee et.al. 2007 ) has consistently argued that decentralization of provision of public goods leads to better matches of public goods to pubic tastes and is therefore preferred. Further, democratic functioning of local administration is considered to lead to greater accountability which would reduce the scope for corruption (Banerjee et. al. 2007 ).
This paper deals with the issue of whether such devolution of responsibilities and, consequently, the subsequent enhancement of welfare have been compromised by rising corruption. Using a unique dataset (REDS 1999 and 2006) we find that the payment of bribes by households increased by almost 40 percent between the 1999 and the 2006 round of the REDS. Bribes are being paid to have problems resolved associated with public services, to improve services to the household or get access to programs, and to offset expected malpractices. Some bribes are paid directly to elected officials, but most bribes are paid to people who have connections to those who manage programs, be they Panchayat elected officials or staff, higher level Panchayat officers, or civil servants of the sectors that are involved in service delivery, and development and welfare programs.
People would not pay bribes if they were able to have their problems resolved and gain access to welfare program without doing so in a local government system that was transparent, with efficient service providers, and with elected and appointed officials of the local government and the services being both approachable and accountable to the citizens.
The bribes therefore are a symptom that the entire rural governance system, not just the Panchayati Raj Institutions (PRI), is not transparent and not efficient, and that neither politicians nor service providers can be easily approached and held properly to account by the citizens. That they are increasing means that these problems are getting worse, rather than better.
Bribes could be increasing because the governance system is deteriorating further, or because the programs for whose benefits bribes are being paid are increasing. Centrally sponsored schemes and Panchayat public expenditures on welfare programs have increased sharply.
Clearly, therefore, the growing opportunities for paying bribes are one of the reasons for their growth.
In this paper we first pursue the question of what determines the payment of bribes. In particular we ask whether the level and the prevalence of bribes could be reduced via governance reforms. a) Would it help to shift the process of beneficiary selection and administration of developmental expenditures to sector staff instead or, to a non-elected but a representative body such as the Gram Sabha? b) Would greater attendance at Gram Sabha meetings reduce payments of bribes? And c) Would it helps to have more female elected officials, in particular more female Pradhans. The answer to the first question is mixed, while the answer to the second two questions is positive.
Bribes can affect the delivery of public goods, access to services such as health and water supply, offset malpractices, and provides access to welfare programs. It is this fourth impact which we measure in this paper, and show to be quite large, especially for people below the poverty line.
Finally we explore the impact of payment of bribes on household consumption. This impact could occur via all of the four impacts of bribes discussed in the last paragraph, but especially from gains in income associated with access to welfare programs. Again we show that the payment of bribes can have a large impact on consumption, with the proportional impact being especially large for the ultra-poor, followed by the poor. Both of these income strata would have experienced a decline in consumption had they not paid bribes, which suggests that they have no choice, but paying bribes.
We interpret the payment of bribes as a second-best response by citizens to the serious deficiencies of local governance in terms of transparency, efficiency, and accountability.
Under these circumstances they need to induce the elected and appointed officials to do their job properly or give them access to welfare payments by paying a bribe. This leads to private benefits of both the bribe payer, and of the person receiving the bribes. But as with all second-best solutions, it is not clear that, given the deficiencies in the governance system, whether the bribes lead to an overall increase in social welfare. Additional research will be required to sort this out.
The plan of the paper is as follows. We first discuss the data and provide a descriptive analysis. We then discuss our methodologies, followed by a results section. We close with conclusions and policy implications.
Data and descriptive analysis
We use data from the Rural Economic and Demographic Survey (REDS) conducted by the National Council for Applied Economic Research (NCAER).These surveys were started in 1969 and represent a panel of 241 villages representing 17 major states of India. In addition to information included in standard multi-purpose household surveys, the REDS contain data on bribes at the household level. We have disaggregated data on the functionary approached (elected or otherwise) by the household for solving a range of problems germane to both community and the household, number of functionaries approached, frequency of such visits, and the specific bribe paid and its frequency. We also have at the member level the incidence of bribes associated with specific services such as health, receipt of welfare benefits, and beneficiary selection.
The survey is in three parts. The listing questionnaire is a census of all the villages covered and provides detailed information of the primary and secondary occupation of the household head, net income, migration, social and economic networks, whether social discrimination was experienced, voting in elections, and Jati. The village questionnaire provides us with details of all aspects of governance including elections, Gram Sabha meetings, government programs, taxation, expenditures, number of village level shocks, amongst other variables.
The household and member level information related to voting and program participation is derived from the household survey. The size of the sample in 1999 and 2006 surveys is 7474
and 8659 households respectively, of which 5885 households were interviewed in both rounds. These two survey rounds cover two Panchayat periods.
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In this section we briefly describe the relevant portions of this data and provide an assessment of quality of governance and the resulting pathologies like bribes in the Panchayats. Table 1 provides details on the sample size, village, and household characteristics. The average number of households in these villages was 700 in 2006, up by 12.46% since the previous survey. Foster and Rosenzweig (2004) citing the 2001 census suggest that the REDS villages are larger in terms of household population compared to an average village in India. A question relevant for this paper directly is whether the affected households lived in specific streets, i.e., the incidence of bribes for improving public works in the vicinity of the residence is worth exploring. Munshi and Rosenzweig (2008) show that households that live in streets in which the elected representatives of the Panchayats reside are on an average better off than others in the village with respect to access to public services and services related to the public distribution system. This may meant that both the adversely affected and bribe paying households reported in Table 2 resided in streets where such representatives do not reside.
But an answer to this question is outside the scope of this paper. Tables 3 and 4 Whatever the reason, the Panchayats as institutions do not come off well in Table 3 . Further, more households pay bribes for accessing programs, problem resolution, improving the quality of services, and avoiding malpractices than before. The finding of concern is that while 29.8% of poor households paid bribes in 1999 this figure rose to 33.7% in 2006.
Tables 3 and 4 here
From table The fact that most bribes are being paid to functionaries with perceived links to elected officials is reflective of the following. a) Certain households were unable to approach the elected officials or were being discriminated against by such officials. Therefore they would rather make use of the network to which these officials belong to according to the households and try and get access to the services and benefits. This could imply a general lack of accessibility of the elected representatives for problem resolution. It would imply a poorly functioning local government. b) It could also imply that there is a genuine lack of information about the mechanisms of service provision and process of governance on the part of the households. Either way this statistic presents a system with widespread incidence of and increases in bribes.
Finally the statistic on repeated payment of bribes, even of those participating in programs over a period of time, suggests that there is a significant correlation between continued participation and payment of bribes. The fact that of all such households this figure was 32.03% in 2006 compared to 16.92% in 1999 suggests that repeated bribes contribute to private economic benefits of households.
Three policy questions can be addressed to Tables 2, 3 , and 4. If the beneficiary selection or administration of various programs is done by elected or appointed officials of Panchayats, would it help to shift the selection process to sector staff instead? (Or, shift the selection to a non-elected but a representative body such as the Gram Sabha?) If selections are done by sector staff, would it help to elevate it to higher levels of the Panchayats which could help in enforcing and verifying rigorous criteria, and make participation more predictable? If the answer to either of these questions is yes, bribes should decrease otherwise bribes will continue unabated or even increase, only the identity of the recipient will change. The third question is whether, for given level of participation, it will help to make payments directly to the beneficiary. In this case bribes to ensure participation would continue, but the need to bribe to actually receive the benefits will either reduce or disappear.
The MGNREGS is designed such that Panchayats are deeply involved in the administration However, the MGNREGS now transfers benefits directly to the beneficiaries' bank accounts.
The work of the Panchayat officials is to provide the beneficiary household with a job card and employment whenever asked (and the fact that MGNREGS funds have been released will be known during Gram Sabha meetings and the households participating in such meetings can therefore hold the Panchayat officials to account). Can such a design reduce the payments of bribes? Evidence from a survey done by one of the authors in all of the REDS villages of Uttar Pradesh, Maharashtra and Orissa shows the following; at the time of delivery of the job card, the Panchayat official comes to an "agreement" with the beneficiary wherein the beneficiary agrees to part with a potion of the transfers. This is how it works in some of the observed cases: The Job card is released to the applicant and 100 days work is granted at the rate of Rs 150 per day. Of the Rs 15000 transferred to the beneficiary, the aforementioned beneficiary "agrees" to "give" Rs 5000 to the official against 0 days of actual work. In Uttar Pradesh, 30%, the percentage of all such "beneficiaries have paid such bribes." is 44%.
Therefore direct transfers and Panchayat administration may not reduce the payments of bribes and payments for no work provided.
Methodology
We posit that changes in changes in bribes, consumption growth and program participation are jointly determined and endogenous to each other. Therefore, a three stage estimation strategy is adopted presuming the existence of a linear system of M equations with jointly dependent and predetermined variables.
(1) 
The distribution of the disturbances is supposed to be independent of the predetermined variables in the system, the reduced form is assumed to exist and the equations are either just identified or over identified (Kapteyn and Fiebig, 1981) .
i) Estimating Payment of Bribes
We construct a bribe index to measure the diversity of bribes. The bribe index (at the village level is: 
ii) Estimating Changes in Per Capita Consumption
Change in household's welfare is measured by changes in its change in per capita consumption. Change in per capita consumption is estimated as follows.  is the random error.
The unique identifiers for the consumption function are predicted changes in household wealth. Change in wealth is a consequence of household splits and will adequately explain changes in per capita consumption at the household level. What do bribes accomplish? We have seen in Tables 2, 3 , and, 4, that bribes are being paid for a variety of reasons and to a range of recipients. In this paper, bribes provide improved or differential access to programs and, hence, lead to increases in economic welfare of households though increases in consumption. Bribes are also often paid to maximize both private and group benefits. The latter point is worth elaborating. If households derive benefits due to identification with a specific group-economic or social-then undertaking strategies to maximize group benefits might be source of insurance. Can bribes confer such benefits? We know that such benefits accrue to the group if the Marginal Odds of Participation (MOP) are greater than the Average Odds of Participation (AOP). The AOP is the ratio of the average number of programs participated in by a specific class of households and the overall average 4 Here we estimate predicted change in household's wealth. Changes in household wealth are often a consequence of household splits. Predicted household splits adequately predict changes in wealth (Foster and Rosenzweig, 2001) . We predict the change in wealth as follows.
Where, i indexes households, j the variables and t is time, it W  is the change in household's wealth, jit S is the vector of variables that predict whether a household will split. It includes age of head of the household, change in variance and mean of education of members of household, number of children whose age is less than 15 years, inherited wealth at the beginning of the period (1999), dummies for whether father is co-resident at beginning and at end of the periods (1999 and 2006) , dummies for whether both brothers and sisters are coresident at the beginning and end of the period (1999 and 2006) and, it  is the error term. across all classes of households. The MOP is the increment to participation in a given program by a given class of households. If the MOP is greater than the AOP for any class of households for any given program then that program is being "captured" by the given consumption class. We can extend this argument within specific classes. If, for a given household, its MOP is greater than the AOP for the class in which it is a member of, then, this implies that the given household is increasing its chances of participation relative to all others within that group.
iv) Program Capture
In order to determine whether bribes lead to program capture, we estimate the following equation for different classes of households. For our purposes we identify households by their respective consumption class as ultra poor, poor, non poor, and, affluent. For a given household belonging to consumption class (poor) the average odds of participation (we assume for simplicity of analysis that all programs are homogeneous and there does not exist any preference ordering) is written as is the predicted average bribe paid by households in all other groups. The coefficient 1  is the MOP for that household (or for households for a given consumption class if we estimate these regressions at the aggregate level). If the MOP is greater than the AOP then, this implies capture by the household or, by the consumption class.
Results
We estimated the system of equations shown in 1 and 2 and 3, with results shown in The results on the impact of reelection of the Pradhan are not strong, but are consistent with such reelection leading to reduced payments of bribes. It does not appear that the consolidation of power from reelection leads to more bribes being extracted. But we may be faced with simultaneity here: A Pradhan who accepts fewer bribes may be more likely to be reelected.
How does outside political support affect the payment of bribes? Even though the 73rd amendment does not clearly state that the pradhan or the ward members shall not associate himself/herself with any political party, orders issued by various state governments are clear.
Orissa for example in its order states "There is a complete ban on political parties and elections should be held on a non-party basis". Since the Panchayats receive a significant part of their finances from the State governments, this ban is ostensibly to minimize discrimination at the time of financial allocations to the various Panchayats that might arise due to political affiliations of the Pradhan. Observations during the survey suggest that such affiliations are not revealed by the candidates at the time of elections (to avoid detection by election monitors). 5 However such party affiliations may be known or they may be announced by the winner post elections. The winner may then favor party sympathizers or members in the allocation of benefits from programs. Other households will have to engage in various second best strategies to gain access to these resources. Consistent with this hypothesis, we find that an increase in the incidence of support from political parties leads to a 13% increase in the payment of bribes.
An increase in the bribe concentration index (the share of the bribes paid directly to elected leaders) in a village leads to increased payments of bribes. If the bribe concentration index was to go up by 10 percent, e.g. from 7 percent to 17 percent, then per capita bribes would go up by 3.5 percent. In villages in which there is a broad bribe network rather than bribe collection by powerful elected officials, less bribes are paid. Since the bribe concentration index can go up because the Pradhan is more powerful, or because he/she is more directly approachable by the villagers for problem resolution, more bribes appear to be associated with either of these changes.
The Indices of autonomy over expenditures come from state level schedules that provided the information on whether the specific function is performed by the Panchayat or not for different programs which are implemented at the village level. Out of these we selected the 16 most important ones. Each Autonomy Index measures the proportion of the sixteen programs for which the specific function was devolved. If more powers over allocation of funds in programs and over the execution of programs are devolved to the Panchayats, bribe payment goes down, perhaps because such devolution leads to intensified participation and scrutiny of the programs by the village population. The coefficients are large and highly statistically significant. Increasing the autonomy over expenditures or over implementation by 10 percent will decrease bribe payment by 3.7 and 7 percent respectively. On the other hand, increasing the power of selecting beneficiaries by 10 percent will increase bribe payments by 7.5 percent. If all three measures of autonomy were to be increased by 10 percent, the amount of bribes would fall by 3.2 percent, it therefore matters how autonomy is increased.
To understand we return to the MGNREGS example from three states cited earlier. What was found was that the information about the receipt of financial allocations for this program was usually available only with the elected representatives of Panchayats. This created information asymmetry within the village because Pradhan and ward members then may have used this private information about the magnitude of this transfer to grant benefits (in the form of work allocations) to members of their own Jati. To other members of the village the work allocations could then have been "rationed out" against bribes.
In order to reduce the pathology of bribe payments associated with devolution of the selection of beneficiaries to the Panchayat, it would be important to increase the transparency over receipt of resources for the programs and the selection of beneficiaries. A first measure could be to widely publish in the village all the resources received. Once an electronic payment system is in place, the system could also be used to disseminate such information, or an audit committee of the Gram Sabha could be set up whose terms of references include such information dissemination. Second, the power to select beneficiaries could be transferred to the Gram Sabha, or a subcommittee of the Gram Sabha that reports to the Gram Sabha.
i) Change in Participation in welfare programs
A 10 percent increase in bribes leads to a 10.5 percent increase in the probability of program participation; i.e. the impact of bribes on change in participation is elastic. In panel d of Table   5 we show the resulting predicted program participation for households paying bribes and those not paying bribes, and see that the former are expected to participate almost three times as much as the latter, a huge increase.
We have already seen that regime change in favor of women reduced bribe payments significantly. We find that political reservations of the Pradhan position for women led to a substantial gain in program participation of almost 30 percent. But it appears to be more than wiped out in the subsequent Panchayat when the reservation ends. However to fully assess the impacts of reservations we have to take account of the interaction effect of reservations with the payments of bribes. The first derivatives of program participation with respect to reservations that take account of both the linear and the interaction terms are computed in panel d) of Table 5 . Here we see that current participation has a first derivative at 0.71 while the past reservation has one of 0.7, and both are statistically significant. There is therefore a legacy effect of the reservation of the Pradhan position in terms of average program participation, but it is much smaller than the current impact. This is consistent with the persistence of reservation effects in Deininger et al (2012 a, b) wherein it was shown that improved quality of governance as consequence of reservation will persist beyond the period of reservations. But in the case of program participation the persistence is not very large. 
Growth in Panchayat expenditures

ii) Change in Consumption
The direct impacts of paying bribes on consumption are highly significant. A ten percent increase in bribes leads to a 0.24 percent increase in consumption. Per capita bribes are slightly more than 30 Rupees per year while per capita consumption is about Rs 6500.
Therefore a 3 rupees increase in bribes is estimated to lead to an increase in per capita consumption of 156 rupees. The benefit-cost ratio of the bribe in terms of consumption is 52, assuming no persistence of the benefit stream at all. By contrast, a ten percent increase in predicted total wealth increases consumption by 0.29 percent, just a small fraction more than a ten percent increase in bribes. But ten percent of total wealth on average is about 45 Rupees per capita, while ten percent of bribes are only 3 Rupees. These extremely high payoffs to paying bribes explain why they are increasing steadily.
In contrast, participation in Gram Sabha meetings yields much lower consumption benefits to households as can be seen by the small magnitude of the coefficient (0.0004). If the average number of GS meetings attended is 2, increasing it to 3 while being an increase of 50 percent would increase private consumption by only about 1 Rupee. Gram Sabha participation is therefore not a good way to obtain private benefits, which is a desirable outcome. Table 6 shows that the Affluent have by far the highest predicted consumption change at almost 21 percent on average, followed by the non-poor at 0.63 percent. The poor and ultrapoor have a predicted decline in consumption, with the average decline the sharpest for the ultra-poor at almost 9 percent. Payment of bribes also increases predicted growth for all consumption classes, with the largest proportional gain of 18.5 percent for the ultra-poor, followed by 9.8 percent for the poor. It is clear that the two poor groups cannot avoid paying bribes if they want their consumption to increase.
Table 6 here
The coefficients of Panchayat expenditures on agriculture, welfare programs and public goods on consumption are statistically significant but small. Average per capita expenditure was Rs 6500 in 2006, while per capita public expenditures on agriculture, welfare programs and public goods were Rs 75, 133 and 77 respectively. Combining these numbers with the eastocotoes of these expenditures on per capita consumption we calculate that a ten percent increase in Panchayat per capita expenditures on agriculture, welfare programs and public goods lead to average per capita consumption increases of Rs 3. 25, 3.90, and 5.85 respectively. For the three types of expenditures only 43 %, 29%.and 45% of current expenditures are recovered in terms of an increase in per capita village consumption. But that may not be the whole story, if for example they generated savings and private investment, public investments, or spillovers into subsequent years. Or some of the expenditures could leak out of the village economy. A more comprehensive analysis will be needed to assess the full benefits of Panchayat public expenditures.
We also included the untied revenues from block grants and own taxes in the regression, but these show no impact on consumption, probably because any impact is already captured in by the expenditures on programs.
Household characteristics have predictable impacts on consumption: Average age and education of households, as well as the highest education achieved in the household are associated with increased consumption, while larger household size is associated with a decrease. All these effects are most likely to operate via increases in income.
Conclusions and Policy Implications
Given the poor state of supply of most public goods in rural areas of India a strategy to empower Panchayats to supply thee goods through elected officials was implemented through no less a policy measure than an amendment to the Constitution of India. Our analysis of household level data on bribes, however, does not leave us sanguine.
Average bribes paid increased between 1999 and 2006 and bribes are being used to address a broad range of problems. Repeated payments of bribes even by those who participate in programs have nearly doubled. Most of the bribes are paid not directly to elected officials but to persons understood to be connected to them or to other people with influence over programs. The number of people that have to be approached to resolve problems of any kind has increased. Of particular concern is that even the poorest households paid more bribes.
What the research shows is that people pay bribes in order to have problems resolved, reduce malpractice and get access to welfare programs, and ultimately increase their consumption.
People resort to bribing since they are unable to have their problems resolved. Thus, the presence of bribes is an indication that the rural governance system is not transparent, inefficient, and that neither politicians nor service providers can be held properly to account by the citizens. Further, these problems are getting worse, rather than better.
Payments of bribes could be reduced by a large number of improvements in transparency, efficiency in program administration and accountability to citizens. Thus, we find that bribes decline with an increase of the household in Gram Sabha participation and through a regime change from male to female pradhan.
We showed that if a state grants more autonomy over program expenditures and over the execution of the programs to the Panchayats, bribe payments go down significantly, On the other hand devolving beneficiary selection to the Panchayats tends to increase bribe payments, almost offsetting the gains made via greater autonomy over expenditures and execution. Case studies suggest that information about receipt of resources for programs is closely held by elected and appointed village officials rather than disseminated, and that they also keep control over the beneficiary selection process and resolution of other problems.
Devolving more powers to select beneficiaries to Panchayats therefore needs to be accompanied by improvements in transparency mechanisms over both resources available and beneficiary selection.
On the other hand, outside support by political parties in the elections tends to increase bribe payments. This may be because households not affiliated to the party of the winner may have to pay more bribes to have their problems resolved. Higher concentration of the bribe networks, with more bribes paid directly to the elected officials rather than an intermediary also tends to increase total bribe payments.
Households who pay bribes are able to increase their probability of participation in welfare programs almost three fold. Again political reservations for women tend to increase average program participation rates, with a small but significant legacy impact. An increase in programs available in the village increases participation rates on average. For welfare and public goods programs, also paying a bribe increases this impact by over 40 percent. We also
show that the payment of bribes by people below the poverty line increases their probability of program participation sharply compared to the non-poor people (the left out category).
We also find that the impact of paying bribes on consumption per capita is very large. The affluent have by far the highest predicted consumption change followed by the non-poor. The poor and ultra-poor have a predicted decline in consumption, with the average decline the sharpest for the ultra-poor. Payment of bribes increases predicted growth for all consumption classes, with the largest proportional gain for the ultra-poor, followed by the poor. It is clear that the two poor groups cannot avoid paying bribes if they want their consumption to increase.
Whether bribes lead not just to private benefits, but also to social benefits depends on the purpose of the bribe. If it was paid to resolve a problem with the provision of a public good that benefits the entire or parts of a community, there could be positive spillovers to other households. However, if the bribe is paid to get access to a rationed welfare benefit, and leads to the exclusion of another household that does not pay a bribe, the consumption benefit of one household is wiped out by the consumption loss of another one, and there is no social benefit. Further research is required to sort these issues out.
Panchayat expenditures on agriculture, welfare programs and public goods on consumption are statistically significant but small. However, there could be spillovers to next year's * If the household paid bribe to someone other than the responsible functionary due to perceived links of the recipient of the bribe to the functionary then it is counted as 1 else 0.
# If the household paid bribe to the functionary responsible for the administrator of the program then it is counted as 1 else 0.
^ If household participated in any one of the welfare programs and also paid bribe it is counted as 1 else 0. #As predicted by the systems of equations (Percentage contribution to total participation in parenthesis) ## First derivative of participation with respect to reservations, using both linear and interaction term with bribe paid 
